We investigate the e¤ects of attending a more advanced track in middle school on long-term education and labor market outcomes for Germany, a country with a rigorous early-age tracking system, where the risk of misallocating students to tracks is particularly high. Our research design exploits quasi-random shifts between tracks induced by date of birth, and speaks to the long-term e¤ects of early track attendance for a group of marginal students most at risk of misallocation. Remarkably, we …nd no evidence that attending a more advanced track leads to more favourable long-term outcomes. We attribute this result to the possibility of later track-reversal. JEL No.: I21, J10
Introduction
Countries di¤er widely with respect to the way they organise their school systems. While Germany and Singapore deliberately track students into di¤erent schools based on ability as early as the end of elementary school (ages 10/12), other countries, such as the U.S., the U.K., and Japan, essentially keep their entire secondary education system comprehensive.
Proponents of tracking systems stress that allocating students to learning environments more adequate for their abilities can lead to more e¢ cient educational production, whereas opponents argue that tracking may exacerbate initial disadvantages. Most particularly, they point to the danger that small di¤erences between students in innate ability or social background before tracking may translate into large di¤erences in adult outcomes through exposure to very di¤erent learning environments. This problem is particularly acute in a system that tracks students very early on, when information about the student's learning potential is likely to be incomplete and track allocation is, at least to some extent, determined by sheer luck. But initial mis-tracking need not lead to life-long disadvantage, as long as the tracking system has built-in ‡exibilities that allow correction of initial choices at a later point, and when more information about individuals' abilities is available. This important aspect in assessing tracking systems has hardly been discussed in the literature so far.
Thus, to assess whether early track allocation has indeed life-long consequences, and whether a tracking system successfully allows for correcting initial misallocations, requires a comparison of long-term educational and labour market outcomes of individuals who were at the margin between two tracks, and who were randomly allocated into a higher or a lower track. It is such a natural experiment on which we draw in this paper. We explore this for Germany, a country with a particularly rigorous tracking system that very early on (at age 10) allocates students into three di¤erent school tracks based on ability and locks them into the assigned track throughout middle school (i.e., from grades 5 to 9). These tracks are designed to support particular career paths: the high track prepares students for college or university education, while the medium and low tracks aim at providing skills for white and blue collar apprenticeships. As a result, the three tracks di¤er widely, especially in terms of teaching curricula as well as peer and teacher quality.
Our research design exploits quasi-random shifts between tracks induced by date of birth.
Based on this design, discussed in detail in Section 3.1, we can identify (a lower bound of) the causal e¤ect of track exposure for students who are at the margin between two tracks (hereafter, marginal students). These are students whose parents or teachers may be unsure of which track the student should attend after elementary school and who are therefore most at risk of misallocation. We …rst show that children who are born after the age of school entry cut-o¤ date are more likely to attend a more advanced track in middle school than children who are born before the age of school entry cut-o¤ date, and who are thus younger in class. This is the …rst stage of our analysis. We then investigate the impact of date of birth on long-term labour market outcomes and educational attainment, obtaining reduced form estimates. Despite the di¤erences in learning environments between tracks and a strong …rst stage, we …nd that date of birth has no e¤ect on wages, employment or occupation choice at later ages. This suggests that, for students at the margin between two tracks, attending a more advanced track in middle school bears little bene…ts later in life.
What explains this surprising …nding? We attribute it to the up-and downgrading of students between tracks that takes place at a later stage of their educational career: We …rst show a substantial amount of movement from the low or medium to the high track at the end of middle school (age 15/16), an upgrading facilitated by the school system. We further demonstrate a substantial amount of downgrading at the age of 18/19 through nonenrollment in college or university after graduating from the high track. Due to this upand downgrading, attending a more advanced track induced by birth date has, for marginal students, hardly any impact on the probability of graduating from a medium or high track, completing an apprenticeship, or graduating from college or university. These …ndings of zero e¤ects on long-term outcomes for marginal students do not imply that there is no di¤erence in observed outcomes of students who sort into di¤erent tracks in middle school: Our own calculations based on the German Socio-Economic Panel show that these di¤erences are large, re ‡ecting the ability-based selection that characterises a tracking system. 1 These …ndings emphasise a core aspect of the basis on which tracking systems should be assessed: the built-in possibilities to correct earlier allocations at a stage when more information is revealed about a student's true potential. That is, although the young age at which the tracking decision is taken creates particularly large risks for student misallocation, the system we study also allows students whose potential has been erroneously assessed to revise the initial track decision at later stages in their educational careers. Our …ndings underscore that these built-in ‡exibilities allow marginal students to fully make up for the exposure to a less challenging school environment during middle school-even if the exposure to a less challenging school environment is prolonged (in our case 5 to 6 years) and the di¤erences in school environments are large.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature and the German tracking system. Sections 3 and 4 then outline our empirical research design and data sources, respectively. Section 5 reports the empirical results, and Section 6 presents our discussion and conclusions. Besides reporting additional results in the Appendix, we also provide a theoretical model of track choice which formalises the shifting of students to a di¤erent track because of birth month, and clari…es how the key di¤erences between school tracks (i.e., teaching technology and peer quality) may a¤ect long-term outcomes.
Background

Existing Literature
The literature on tracking has adopted three approaches to assess the e¤ects of tracking on student outcomes, relying on across-country, within-country and within-school variation.
Exploiting variation in school systems across countries, Hanushek and Wössmann (2006) show that the variance of the test score distribution increases between elementary and middle school in countries with a tracked school system relative to countries with a comprehensive school system, without an increase in the mean. They thus conclude that tracking increases achievement of high ability students at the expense of low ability students. Waldinger (2007) argues that these …ndings are sensitive to the way countries are categorised into a tracked and comprehensive school system.
A number of recent papers evaluate policy reforms which e¤ectively reduced tracking within a country. For instance, while Malamud and Pop-Echeles (2011), Kerr, Pekkarinen, and Uusitalo (2013) and Hall (2012) study the e¤ects of deferring tracking to a later age, Guyon, Maurin and McNally (2012) investigate the e¤ects of an increase in the share of students admitted to the academic (grammar) school track. Both the across-country and within-country studies should be seen as complementary to our paper: While these studies are informative about which students may bene…t or lose from a tracked versus a non-tracked school system, or from de-tracking, they do not investigate the long-term consequences initial misallocation to tracks and the role of ‡exibilities built into a tracking system to remedy such misallocation-which is the focus of this paper. Betts (2011) analyze the e¤ects of tracking within schools, as often practiced in the U.S. Most of these earlier studies do not take into account the sorting of students into tracks, or into schools that o¤er tracking. A study by Du ‡o, Dupas, and Kremer (2011) addresses this, by randomly allocating schools to tracked and non-tracked schools. In tracked schools, students are assigned to the higher track based on a test. Similar to our study, these authors carry out a regression discontinuity design, comparing students whose test results put them at the margin between two tracks. They …nd no e¤ect of attending the high track on achievement for the marginal student, a result that we complement in our natural experiment for Germany for long-term outcomes. These authors also estimate the impact of within-school tracking on the entire test score distribution, and conclude that all students-including those in the lower track-bene…t from tracking. While our research design does not allow us to assess these overall e¤ects of a tracked versus a non-tracked education system, an important advantage of our study is that we are able to estimate the long-term e¤ects (as opposed to the short-term e¤ects, as in Du ‡o, Dupas, and Kremer, 2011) of attending a more advanced track for a group of marginal students most at risk of misallocation.
Studies surveyed comprehensively by
Our paper is also related to the literature on school quality; in particular that on elite schools where, similar to Du ‡o, Dupas, and Kremer (2011), attendance at an elite school is determined by an entry examination. This set-up lends itself to a regression discontinuity design, where the e¤ects of attending an elite school are estimated by comparing outcomes of students who in the entry exam scored just below or just above the attendance cut-o¤-which are students at the margin between elite and non-elite schools. Previous papers on this issue reach con ‡icting conclusions. For instance, whereas Jackson (2010) and Pop-Echeles and Urquiola (2013) …nd that attending better schools improves children's academic achievement, Clark (2010) and Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist and Pathak (2011) …nd no evidence that elite schools improve standardised test scores. Since these studies focus on academic achievement before …nal educational choices are made, they essentially identify a short-term e¤ect of school quality. This e¤ect may di¤er considerably from the long-term e¤ect of school quality that also depends on subsequent educational choices, which is what we study in this paper. 2 Figure 1 provides an overview of the German education system, where students are allocated into three tracks at the end of fourth grade (around the age of 10). We designate these tracks 'high', 'medium', and 'low'. Education in the high track, the Gymnasium (comparable to the traditional British grammar school) lasts for nine years (grades 5 to 13) and prepares students for tertiary studies at such academic institutions as four-year colleges or …ve-year universities. Education at the low and medium track, on the other hand, lasts …ve (grades 5 to 9) and six years (grades 5 to 10), respectively, is less academic, and prepares students for an apprenticeship in blue-collar (e.g., crafts) or white-collar occupations (e.g., o¢ ce clerk, but also medical assistant). For men and women born between 1961 and 1976, the cohorts focused on in the empirical analysis, the shares of who attends each track are roughly of equal size.
General Overview of the German Education System
Although there is no strict rule (such as an entry exam) to determine which track children can attend after elementary school, elementary school teachers do make recommendations.
However, in 10 out of 16 states, parents have the …nal word on this choice. In the remaining 6 states, if parents want to deviate from the teachers'recommendation, students must either have earned the required marks or pass a special test. 3 In principle, students may switch between tracks at any grade throughout middle school; however, in practice, very few students (less than 2%) do so. 4 Hence, once students are allocated, they are locked into their chosen track for at least …ve years. However, once 2 Other studies which exploit quasi-random variation to investigate the short-term e¤ects of school quality on student achievement include Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2004) and Levitt (2005, 2006) . Recently, a number of studies on the long-term e¤ects of school quality on adult outcomes have emerged (e.g., Chetty, Friedman, Hilger, Saez, Whitmore Schanzenbach and Yagan, 2011; Deming, Hastings, Kaine and Staiger, 2012). Due to a di¤erent research design, these studies do not necessarily identify the e¤ects of school quality for the marginal student, and may thus not be directly comparable to our study. 3 For more information, see http://www.kmk.org/…leadmin/veroe¤entlichungenn_beschluesse/2010/2010n_10n_18n-Uebergang-Grundschule-Sn_eI1-Orientierungsstufe.pdf 4 Own calculations based on the School Census for Bavaria and Hesse. students complete their course at the low or medium track (i.e., after ninth or tenth grade), the school system facilitates switches between tracks. In particular, at the end of ninth grade, low track students may either switch to a medium track school or, provided that their school o¤ers this possibility, stay on for another year to earn the same school-leaving quali…cation which they would have received from a medium track school. In addition, after tenth grade, students who graduated from a medium track school may either upgrade to a traditional high track school, or attend a high track school targeted at former medium track students. These latter often provide a special focus (e.g., agricultural, business, health, or social studies) in addition to general education, and we label them 'specialised high track schools'(see Figure 1 ). Like graduation from a general high track school, graduation from a specialised high track school grants access to college or university, but possibly restricts the …eld of study.
Two further factors facilitate track switching in the German education system such that students can make up for exposure to a less challenging middle school track. First, legal regulations at the state level limit German universities'ability to pick students from particular schools. Most importantly, school marks are the main criterion for entry into almost all courses of studies and must be taken into account mechanically to assign university placesthat is regardless of whether they are from a traditional or specialised high track school and without concern for the reputation of the high track school. A second facilitating element for track changers is the overwhelmingly state-…nanced nature of the education system in Germany-as opposed to a largely property-tax funded school system in the U.S. This state …nancing-which is mostly based on student head counts for both schools and universitiesgenerates a comparatively large equality in the endowment and quality between educational institutions, including universities. In particular, the concept of an elite university eludes
Germany for the cohorts we study. 5 5 Still today, students looking for an elitist education go abroad, mostly to the Anglo-Saxon world.
Di¤erences between Tracks
The …rst important di¤erence between the three tracks is that they di¤er with respect to teaching intensity and learning goals. 6 We summarise the details in Panel A of Table 1 . In ninth grade (i.e., when attendance at low track schools ends), the number of hours taught per week is 36 at high, but only 32 at medium and low track schools, respectively. Moreover, although the number of weekly hours in core subjects like Mathematics, German, and English as a foreign language is similar across tracks, high track schools teach more hours in the second and third foreign language and natural sciences, and fewer hours in social sciences, physical education, and vocational subjects (e.g., the 'World of Work') than low or medium track schools. In the core subjects of mathematics and German, tracks di¤er with respect to the topics taught as well as teaching intensity. For example, whereas low track schools put special emphasis in ninth grade on such applications as writing CVs, …lling out forms, and preparing for job interviews, high track schools pay special attention to detailed explanations, analysis, and interpretation of various types of texts, including historical documents, and stress creative writing. Likewise, whereas ninth-grade mathematics in medium track schools covers topics such as real numbers and powers and equations with two unknowns, these topics are taught in eighth grade in high track schools. Similarly, although both medium and high track schools introduce functions, high track schools do so more intensely and cover advanced functions (e.g., exponential and broken power functions) not taught in medium track schools. Low track schools, in contrast, sometimes cover no functions at all, focusing instead on equations with rational numbers.
A second important di¤erence is that students attending the high or medium track are surrounded by academically stronger peers than students attending the low track. According to PISA data for 2003 and 2006, average reading and mathematics test scores at high track 6 The information in this paragraph was gathered from the curricula published on the web pages of the Ministries for Culture and Education of West German states. In some cases, we also contacted the ministries by telephone. schools are about one standard deviation higher than at medium track schools and about 1.7 standard deviations higher than at low track schools in ninth grade (see Panel B of Table   1 ). These di¤erences in peer quality across school tracks are far larger than those in the quasi-experiments by Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) and Cullen, Jakob and Levitt (2006) (around 0.20 of a standard deviation in both cases). The …gures in the table also show that high track students are exposed to peers whose family backgrounds are more academic than those of potential classmates at medium or low track schools, and that high track students come from higher income households: only 39 percent live in households with a below-median income, a number that increases to 65 percent for medium track students and 76 percent for low track students. 7 It should also be noted that track choice alone can explain more than 80 percent of the variation in test scores across schools in ninth grade, suggesting that schools of the same type are fairly homogeneous.
A third important di¤erence between the three tracks is that teachers in high track schools are likely to be of higher quality than teachers in medium or low track schools.
More speci…cally, as Panel C of Table 1 shows, the minimum formal education for high track teachers is one year higher than that for low and medium track teachers, and their salaries are approximately 10 percent higher.
Research Design
Randomization into Tracks
To identify a causal e¤ect, we require an experiment that e¤ectively randomises students of the same ability into di¤erent tracks after elementary school. Figure 2 provides an illustration of our natural experiment. Our starting point is that, because of the school entry cut-o¤ rule, children whose birthdays fall before July 1 typically start school a year earlier than 7 Panel B of Table 1 also shows that the share of girls in low track schools is about 14 percentage points lower than in high track schools, which may boost the performance of boys and girls at school (e.g., Schanzenbach, 2009; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011) and in the labor market (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2012) . children whose birthdays are on or after July 1. Hence, although not every child complies with this law, children born shortly after the cut-o¤ date, in July, are on average considerably older at school entry than children born shortly before the cut-o¤ date, in June. A large body of literature has shown that age of school entry is an important determinant of early student achievement; see e.g., Bedard and Dhuey (2006) ; Puhani and Weber (2007); Elder and Lubotsky (2009); and Schneeweiss and Zweimüller (2014) . Since the decision which track to attend is made very early in Germany, at a stage when the age of school entry e¤ect is unlikely to have dissipated, the date of birth may, through its link to age of school entry, a¤ect the track students attend after elementary school and, given the limited possibilities of switching during grades 5 through 9, lock them into a particular track throughout middle school (see the …rst e¤ect in Figure 2 ). Hence, the …rst stage of our analysis addresses the di¤erence in track assignment through grades 5 and 9, T , between children born in month Z, where Z i = 1 if the individual is born in July rather than June:
We then investigate the impact of birth month on long-term labour market outcomes like wages and unemployment. The reduced-form of our analysis is the di¤erence in these longterm outcomes (denoted by Y ) between students born in July and those born in June:
To guide the interpretation of this reduced-form e¤ect, consider the following 'causal'model of track attendance and long-term outcomes:
where SSA i denotes school starting age and A i denotes scholastic ability, both of which determine selection into tracks and are thus correlated with T i . For simplicity, we restrict the e¤ects of school starting age and ability on long-term outcomes to be constant across individuals, but allow the e¤ect of track attendance to vary across individuals. Suppose that date of birth is as good as randomly assigned and therefore independent of potential outcomes and track attendance so that E[A i jZ i = 1] = E[A i jZ i = 0]. We provide evidence in favor of this independence assumption below. Under this assumption, and distinguishing between three tracks, low (L), medium (M ) and high (H), the reduced-form e¤ect of date of birth on long-term outcomes equals 8
The …rst term captures the causal impact of attending the medium rather than the low track in middle school on the long-term outcomes for those individuals who attend the medium track if born in July but the low track if born in June (i.e.,
, multiplied with the share of children shifted between these two tracks because of month of birth (i.e., Pr(L i jZ i = 0) Pr(L i jZ i = 1)). Similarly, the second term represents the local average treatment e¤ect of attending the high rather than the medium track in middle school for those individuals who attend the high track if born in July but the medium track if born in June, multiplied with the share of individuals shifted between these two tracks because of their birth month. If delayed school entry conveys advantages or disadvantages even in adulthood, the reduced-form estimate additionally captures this direct e¤ect of school starting age (the third term in equation (2)).
The exclusion restriction While we focus our discussion on the reduced form estimates, we can obtain the impact of track assignment in middle school on long-term outcomes by dividing the reduced-form e¤ect by the …rst-stage e¤ect, = = : As equation (2) shows, the interpretation of this parameter as the causal impact of track assignment on long-term outcomes requires an additional assumption to the independence assumption (exclusion restriction), namely that that school starting age a¤ects long-term outcomes solely through track assignment in middle school (i.e., a 2 = 0). There are two reasons why this assumption may be violated. First, if date of birth, through the interaction between age of school entry and compulsory school leaving laws, a¤ects the length of formal schooling (see the third e¤ect in Figure 2 , implying a 2 < 0). This is the case in the U.S., where students are allowed to leave school at the day of their 16th birthday. 9 In Germany, however, this e¤ect is absent, since students must stay in school until they at least complete 9th grade (as opposed to their 16th birthday, as in the U.S.).
Second, the exclusion restriction would also be violated if being older at school entry has a direct impact on long-run outcomes that does not operate through track assignment in middle school (see the second e¤ect in Figure 2 , implying a 2 > 0). We have reviewed more than 30 articles that study the impact of age at school entry on achievements. This literature has found direct e¤ects of age of school entry on long-run (prime age) earnings or educational attainment to be either non-existent or positive. 10 None of the papers we have reviewed …nds a negative e¤ect of being older at school entry on short-or longer term outcomes. 11 Therefore, even if the initial advantages of delayed school entry indeed persisted into adulthood, these e¤ects are likely to be positive, leading to an upward bias in our estimates. Because we do not …nd a signi…cantly positive e¤ect of date of birth on long-term outcomes, this reasoning reinforces our …nding that a more advanced track assignment in middle school has no positive e¤ects on adult outcomes.
The independence assumption The causal interpretation of the reduced-form estimate (and thus the IV estimate) further hinges on the independence assumption, which in our baseline speci…cation entails that whether a child is born in June or July is random. In the regression discontinuity estimates that exploit the exact date of birth (see below), the independence assumption requires that whether a child is born just before or just after the school entry cut-o¤ date (i.e., on June 30 or July 1) is random. Note that since we are comparing individuals born within the same season, this independence assumption is considerably weaker here than in studies that use birth quarter as an instrument.
This assumption could be violated if parents timed the birth of their children to take advantage of a later school start age. This is unlikely in our case, as the school entry rule was not rigidly enforced and parents could decide against that rule if they felt strongly about it. To assess more formally whether the independence assumption is violated, we have implemented a test for bunching of births around the age of school entry cut-o¤, based on McCrary (2008). We …nd no evidence for bunching. For instance, when using a bandwidth of 20 days, we obtain a discontinuity between June 30 and July 1 of 0.0052 (in log di¤erence), with a standard error of 0.0038. We obtain similar estimates for any day between May 1st
and August 31st. 12 and Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2011). We eliminate this experience e¤ect using various methods (see Section 5.2 for details), so that our estimates of the impact of track assignment in middle school on wages are not a¤ected by this mechanism. 12 These estimates are based on the number of individuals born on a given day observed in the social security data and therefore include only those individuals who at least once had a job covered by the social security system. Hence, a discontinuity could potentially arise for two reasons: …rst, because parents may time their births to take advantage of age of school entry rules. Second, because delayed school entry might a¤ect the probability of having held at least one job within the social security system. Our …ndings suggest
We have also compared the parental characteristics of children born in July versus those born in June using German Microcensus data for 2005 (see Table A1 ). We …nd no signi…cant di¤erences between children born in July and those born in June in terms of parental education and their age at the children's birth.
The Group of Compliers Equation (2) illustrates that the reduced form estimates are informative about the causal long-term e¤ects of attending a more advanced track for a particular group of individuals: those individuals who attend a more or less advanced track because of their birth month. Who are these 'compliers'? Students at the top of the (expected) ability distribution are likely to attend the high track, whereas students at the bottom of the distribution are likely to attend the low track, regardless of their date of birth. Hence, the compliers are likely to be students at the margin between two tracks. This group is particularly interesting because it consists of children whose teachers and parents may be unsure of which track the student should attend after elementary school and who are therefore most at risk of misallocation-and for whom small di¤erences in the perceived learning potential at the end of elementary school could potentially lead to large di¤erences in adult outcomes.
We develop a stylised model of track choice in Appendix B which formalises the shifting of students to a di¤erent track because of birth month; this model is not necessary to understand the paper, but formalises the intuition outlined above (see Proposition 1 and Figure A3 ). The model also clari…es how the key di¤erences between school tracks (i.e., teaching technology, peer quality and teacher quality) and the costs of switching between tracks may a¤ect completed education (see Proposition 2) and long-term labour market outcomes (see Proposition 3). that neither is important.
Implementation
Reduced-Form Estimates
To implement our empirical strategy, we estimate reduced-form e¤ects by replacing the population means in equations (1) and (2) with their sample means, while controlling for birth year and gender e¤ects. 13 We also report regression discontinuity estimates that exploit the student's exact date of birth. 14 Speci…cally, we estimate regressions of the following type:
Here, Day i is the student's date of birth (normalised to be 0 on the school entry cut-o¤ date, July 1), h(:) is a polynomial function of birthday, Post i is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the student was born on or after July 1, and x i is a control variable vector that includes birth year and gender e¤ects. The parameter of interest is 1 , the impact of being born after the school entry cut-o¤ date (i.e., on or after July 1) on long-term outcomes. We …rst estimate equation (3) on a sample of all students and then restrict the sample to students born within three months of the school entry cut-o¤ date (i.e., to students born between April and September). We approximate the function h(Day i ) as a polynomial function of various orders. As suggested by Lee and Card (2007) , we cluster standard errors at the date of birth level. 15 
First-Stage Estimates
Due to lack of precise information on date of birth in the German Microcensus (see Section 4.2), we are not able to estimate the same speci…cations for the …rst-stage estimates for the same birth cohorts. We instead compare track attendance in middle school of students born 13 Our results remain almost unchanged if we exclude these control variables from the regressions. 14 We cannot do this for the …rst-stage e¤ect because our data sets provide information only on birth month or whether the pupil was born earlier or later during the year; see Sections 4.2 and 4.3 for details. 15 Our baseline estimate comparing individuals born in June with those born in July may also be seen as a regression discontinuity estimate in which the sample is restricted to students born within two months of the school entry cut-o¤ date and the birthday e¤ect (h(:) in equation (3)) is assumed to be constant. earlier (i.e., between January and April) and later (i.e., between May and December) during the year (instead of June/July). In Section 5.1, we provide evidence that this is likely to lead to an underestimate in the …rst-stage estimates, which causes bias away from zero in the estimate of our local average treatment e¤ect^ .
Data
Our empirical analysis combines four main data sources, described below. Throughout the analysis, we exclude foreign citizens from our sample because they may have migrated to Germany after beginning school and thus may not have been a¤ected by the school entry cut-o¤ date. Since a di¤erent age of school entry cut-o¤ rule applied in East Germany, we further restrict the sample to West German residents.
Social Security Records
Our primary data used to estimate the reduced-form equations (see equation (2)), which relate long-term outcomes to date of birth, come from three decades of social security records, covering 1975 to 2006. These data, collected for every individual covered by the social security system, include detailed information on variables such as education, wages, unemployment, occupation, and the exact date of birth. Not included are civil servants, the self-employed, and military personnel. A comparison of the number of observations in the Social Security Records and the number of births in the Birth Register data suggests that at least 84% individuals enter the data base at some point in their career. 16 From this data base, we select all men and women born between 1961 and 1976. The 1961 cohort is the …rst cohort for which the e¤ective school entry cut-o¤ falls between June and July. The 1976 cohort is 30 years old in the last year of our data and should thus have completed post-secondary education. For these cohorts, we observe the entire work history from labour market entry onwards, which allows precise computation of their potential and actual labour market experiences. The wage variable refers to April 30 of each year and is de ‡ated using the Consumer Price Index, with 1995 as the base year. 17 We distinguish four educational categories: "no post-secondary education"refers to individuals who graduated from the low or medium track and did not complete an apprenticeship;
"apprenticeship"includes individuals who completed an apprenticeship (as part of the formal German vocational education system) but did not complete college or university, regardless of track completed; 18 and 'college'and 'university'refer to individuals who have graduated from four-year college or …ve-year university, respectively. Our unemployment variable refers to registered unemployment.
Microcensus
Our second data come from the scienti…c use …les of the German Microcensus for 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1985, and 1987 . We use these data to estimate the …rst-stage equations (see equation (1)) which relates track assignment in middle school to date of birth. We restrict the sample to the same birth cohorts as for the social security records, 1961 to 1976. Rather than specifying the exact birth month, the Microcensus provides only a binary indicator for individuals'being born either during the January through April period or the May through December period. Comparing these two periods is likely to yield an underestimate of the …rst-stage since the school entry cut-o¤ falls in June/July. We assess this using data from the recent School Census for Bavaria and Hesse, which do contain information on birth month, but are unfortunately not available for the earlier school cohorts studied here.
School Census
The School Census for Bavaria and Hesse covers all students attending general and vocational schools in these two German states. It is available for the academic school years 2004/05 to 2008/09 for Bavaria, and for the academic school years 2002/03 to 2008/09 for Hesse. The data set does include information on track and grade attended, as well as on birth month.
We use these data to assess the downward bias in our …rst-stage estimates resulting from the lack of exact birth month information in the Microcensus data, for the 1990 to 1994 birth cohorts in Bavaria and the 1988 to 1994 birth cohorts in Hesse, respectively. We also use them to illustrate the impact of birth month on the probability that the student graduates from a specialised or general high track school, for the 1986-1987 birth cohorts in Bavaria and the 1984-1987 birth cohorts in Hesse, respectively.
1987 Census
Our fourth data source is the 1987 census which, unlike the social security records, contains information on the school track individuals graduated from. Like the German Microcensus, however, the 1987 census (the last census in Germany before the 2011 census) includes no information on exact birth month, asking respondents instead whether they were born before or after May 24. We use these data to estimate the e¤ect of being born later versus earlier in the year on the probability that the student graduates from a low, medium or high track school for the 1961 to 1963 birth cohorts who were between 24 and 26 years old at the time of the census and should thus have completed their secondary education. Unlike the School Census, the 1987 Census does not allow us to distinguish between graduation from a general or specialised high track school.
Results
The Impact of Date of Birth on Track Assignment in Middle School
We …rst investigate the e¤ect of date of birth on track assignment in middle school, which is the …rst stage of our analysis. Since the opportunities to switch tracks between grade 5 and 9 are limited (see Section 2.2), we proxy track assignment in middle school by the track attended at age 14.
Our results in Panel A of Table 2 , based on the German Microcensus, show that children born later in the year (May through December) are 2.0 percentage points more likely to attend a high track at age 14 and 1.9 percentage points less likely to attend a low track at age 14 than children born earlier in the year (January through April), for a total e¤ect of 3.9 percentage points. As Table A2 shows, this e¤ect is strongly persistent throughout grades 5 to 9. Based on data from the School Census, the estimates indicate that the e¤ect of date of birth on track assignment is roughly constant throughout middle school. 19 Since the Microcensus lacks information on birth month, these estimates compare children born before and after the end of April, rather than children born before June 30th and after June 30th. As discussed in Section 4.2, this is likely to lead to underestimation in our …rst-stage regression because it introduces measurement error in the age of school entry.
We investigate this possibility using the School Census, which contains information on birth month (although only for recent cohorts who have not entered the labour market yet). Using this data source, we …nd that children born in July are 5.2 percentage points more likely to attend a high track school and 4.2 percentage points less likely to attend a low track than children born in June, for a total e¤ect of 9.4 percentage points (row (i) of Panel B, Table 19 It follows from these estimates that birth month roughly shifts as many students between the low and the medium track (Pr(LjZ i = 0) Pr(LjZ i = 1) = 0:019) as between the medium and high track (Pr(HjZ i = 1) Pr(HjZ i = 0) = 0:020):This implies that the relative weight for the local average treatment e¤ect on long-term outcomes of attending a medium as opposed to a low track school is 0.49 (0.019/0.039), while the relative weight for the local average treatment e¤ect of attending a high as opposed to a medium track school is 0.51 (0.020/0.039).
2). 20 If instead we reconstruct the same aggregation as in the Microcensus and compare the track assignment of children born between May and December with those born between January and April, we …nd a smaller …rst-stage estimate of 7.2 percentage points (row (ii) of Panel B, Table 2 ). This suggests indeed that the …rst-stage estimate of 3.9 percentage points in Panel A of Table 2 is likely to be an underestimate of the impact of date of birth on track attendance.
Even after adjusting for measurement error, the …rst-stage results for the recent cohorts in the School Census appear stronger than those for the older cohorts in the Microcensus (7.2 vs. 3.9 percentage points). In Appendix A. 2, we provide evidence that this di¤erence can be fully explained by the earlier cohorts'being less compliant with the school entry age cut-o¤ rule than the more recent cohorts. Hence, the mechanism generating the date-of-birth e¤ect on track choice-namely, that age of school entry increases the likelihood of attending a more advanced track-seems to be similar for both earlier and more recent cohorts.
Date of Birth, Track Assignment in Middle School, and Long-Term labour Market
Outcomes
The previous section shows that the date of birth has a precisely estimated and sizable e¤ect on track assignment in middle school, with at least 3.9 percent of students shifted to a di¤erent track because of their date of birth. Thus, since the di¤erences between tracks are large (see Section 2.3), and since only the high track leads to direct admission at colleges and universities, we would expect to …nd sizeable e¤ects of date of birth on long-term labour market outcomes, such as wages, employment and occupational choice. This is what we investigate in this section, starting with the impact on wages. Our analysis draws on data 20 The e¤ect of date of birth is further illustrated in Figure A1 in Appendix A. 1, where we display the share of 14-year-olds attending a high (Panel A) or a low (Panel B) track by month of birth. The …gure shows a clear discontinuity in track assignment around the June/July school entry cut-o¤ date, con…rming that the di¤erences in track assignment between June-and July-born children are indeed driven by di¤erences in age of school entry. from the social security records, and restricts the sample to men aged 30 and over. 21 Wages One problem with assessing the e¤ect of date of birth and hence track assignment on wages is that individuals who are born in July start school later, and hence enter the labour market later, so that they have, at any given age, accumulated less labour market experience than individuals born in June. Panel A of Figure 3 illustrates this e¤ect, where we plot raw log-wages (i.e., wages unadjusted for the experience) against date of birth, restricting the sample to men who are employed full-time. The …gure shows a clear wage disadvantage for men born just after the school entry cut-o¤ date (i.e., in July), since they have accumulated less experience than individuals born just before the school entry cut-o¤ date (i.e., in June). To isolate the causal e¤ect of track choice in middle school on wages, we need to eliminate this experience e¤ect. In Panel B of Figure 3 , we plot log wages adjusted for di¤erences in experience, where we get rid of the experience e¤ect by …rst estimating the returns to potential experience based on a 4th order polynomial using OLS and then subtracting these estimates from raw log wages. Panel B no longer shows a discontinuity around the school entry cut-o¤ date. Thus, date of birth, and hence the track attended throughout middle school, has no noticeable impact on experience-adjusted wages for the marginal student. (1), we simply compare outcomes of individuals born in July with those of individuals born in June, the estimates in columns (2) to (6) di¤er by birth month sampling window (January-December in columns (2), (3) and (5); April-September in column (4) and (6)) and the order of the date of birth polynomial included as a control in the discontinuity regression (5th order, 6th order, 2nd order and linear in columns (2), (3), (4)/(5), and (6) respectively). Further, estimates in columns (5) and (6) allow the slope of the control function (h(Day i )) to change at the age of school entry cut-o¤ date.
In row (i) of Panel A we present estimates on raw wages unadjusted for experience. As illustrated in Figure 3 , individuals born just after the school entry cut-o¤ date earn less than individuals born just before the school entry cut-o¤ date according to all speci…cations.
However, once we adjust wages for experience as shown in row (ii), all reduced-form estimates are statistically insigni…cant and closely centered around zero, ranging from (negative) 0.1% in speci…cations (1) and (4) to (pos.) 0.03% in speci…cation (5) . 22 These very small reducedform estimates suggest that-despite the stark di¤erences between tracks-the impact of track attendance in middle school on wages is close to zero for the marginal student. Provided that the exclusion restriction holds (see Section 3.1), we can obtain point estimates of the impact of track attendance in middle school by dividing the reduced-form estimates in Table   3 by the (likely underestimated) …rst-stage estimate of 0.039. These Two Sample-2SLS estimates are likewise close to zero, ranging from from (negative) 2.5% (speci…cation (1)) to (pos.) 0.9% (speci…cation (5)), with 95% con…dence intervals of [-0.074, 0.024] and [-0.050, 0.068], respectively. 23 Next, we show that the reduced-form estimates remain close to zero no matter how we account for the di¤erence in potential experience of individuals born shortly before and shortly after the age of school entry cut-o¤. In Figure 4 , we plot the di¤erence in unadjusted log wages between individuals born in June and July against age, for men born between 1961 and 1964 whom we follow into the labour market until they are at least 42 years 22 In these regressions, older cohorts receive more weight than younger cohorts (e.g., individuals from the 1961 cohort are observed for a maximum of 16 years, whereas individuals from the 1976 cohort are observed at most once). To give each cohort the same weight in the regressions, we have re-estimated the regressions in Table 3 , but collapsing all valid wage spells for an individual into one average wage. These equally weighted estimates are very similar to those reported in Table 3 once we adjust for experience. 23 We compute the variance of the TS-2SLS estimate b as
; whose square root is the estimate of the standard error (when variances in the formula must be replaced by their estimates). Note that both the point estimates and the lengths of the con…dence intervals are likely to be exaggerated, as the …rst-stage estimate of 0.039 is underestimated, as we explain above. of age. The …gure clearly shows that for young ages, individuals born in July earn lower wages than individuals born in June, due to lower labour market experience of July born individuals. However, this di¤erential decreases with age and disappears in the late 30s, re ‡ecting the ‡attening out of wage-age pro…les at higher ages. In Table 4 , we present additional estimates which use alternative ways of adjusting the raw log wage di¤erential for di¤erences in potential experience, focusing on individuals born within one month of each side of the age of school entry cut-o¤, as in column (1) of Table 3 . In column (2) of Table   4 , we allow for a more ‡exible functional form using a set of dummy variables to model the returns to potential experience (instead of a 4th order polynomial as in column (1)).
Results are almost identical. In columns (3) and (4), we restrict the sample to individuals aged 40 years and older whose wages are ‡at with respect to potential experience. In line with Figure 4 , for these individuals, both the raw and experience-adjusted wage di¤erentials are very small and not statistically signi…cant from zero. Our reduced-form estimates of the impact of date of birth on wages therefore do not depend on the particular way we eliminate the experience e¤ect. Table 3 we investigate the impact date of birth may have, through track attendance in middle school, on other labour market outcomes, focusing on the share of days in registered unemployment and the share of days spent working since labour market entry (where we down-weight part-time work relative to full-time work), and current occupational choice (where we distinguish between blue-and white-collar occupations). Like results in Panel A, results refer to men aged 30 and over, 24 but now include, for the unemployment and experience outcomes, all men who ever entered the data base, 25 and for occupational choice, all men observed in the data at a given age (as working full-time, part-time or as registered unemployed). While the e¤ects of birth month (through track attendance in middle school) on labour force participation and unemployment are interesting in their own right, large e¤ects on these outcomes could also potentially bias the wage results which refer only to men who at a given age are working full-time. The estimates show that the e¤ect of date of birth on the share of days spent in unemployment or working is basically zero in all speci…cations. Thus, track assignment appears to have little e¤ect on labour force participation or unemployment. For instance, when dividing the reduced-form estimates by the …rst-stage estimate of 0.039, the Two Sample-2SLS estimates of track attendance in middle school on the share of days spent working since labour market entry range from 0.016 (s.e.: 0.016; column (1)) and -0.005 (s.e.: 0.019; columns (2) and (3)). Furthermore, these results imply that our wage results in Panel A do not su¤er from a selection bias into employment.
Other labour market outcomes In Panel B of
We report results for occupational choice in row (iii). Historically, the low track prepared students for apprenticeships in blue-collar occupations, whereas the medium track prepared them for apprenticeships in white-collar occupations (see Section 2.2). Yet, the reduced-form e¤ect of date of birth on the probability that an individual works in a white collar profession is close to zero.
Overall, therefore, our …ndings show that date of birth has little impact on a variety of long-term labour market outcomes, such as wages, occupational choice, and unemploymentalthough it has a strong impact on the type of track attended in middle school. This points at students who have been mis-tracked due to their birth month to adjust their initial track allocation at a later stage in their educational career. Our discussion in Section 2.2 highlights that the German school system has a number of built-in possibilities that allow for such retracking after grade 9 or 10. We now investigate whether and to what extent such up-and downgrading takes place.
Up-and Downgrading
As discussed above, the German education system allows for two upgrading possibilities from medium to high track schools after middle school (i.e., after 10th grade), by changing to general high track schools, i.e. the same schools attended by high track students throughout middle school, and by attending specialised high track schools, i.e. schools speci…cally designed for graduates from medium track schools to gain access to college or university (see Figure 1 ). There may also be downgrading, through leaving a high track school after 10th grade or by not enrolling in college or university after graduating from a high track school.
Movements between the Medium and High Track:
We …rst investigate movements between the medium track and general high track at the end of middle school, drawing on data from the School Census. In Panel A of Table 5 , row (i) we contrast the di¤erence between students born in July and June in the probability of attending the high track in middle school (proxied by track attendance at age 14) with the di¤erence in the probability of graduating from the general high track (measured at age 22). The …gures point to a substantial amount of movements between the medium and general high track: whereas children born in July are 5.2 percentage points more likely to attend the high track in middle school (see also our …rst-stage estimates in Panel B and row (i) of Table 2 ), they are only 2.0 percentage points more likely to graduate from that track. This decline could either be due to downgrading of July-born students who attend the high track in middle school and leave that track after 10th grade, or due to an upgrading of June-born students who attend the medium track in middle school and enroll in a general high track school after 10th grade. Since the share of students who are enrolled in the high track in middle school is roughly the same as the share of students who graduate from a general high track school (around 36% according to own calculations based on the School Census for Bavaria and Hesse), the decline re ‡ects both an upgrading of students born in June, and a downgrading of students born in July. 26 These numbers consider movements between the medium and general high track only.
Next, we additionally investigate movements between the medium and specialised high track.
Remarkably, the di¤erence between June-and July-born children disappears entirely once we include students who graduate from a specialised high track school in our measure for high track completion (row (ii) in Panel A). This suggests that, for marginal students who attend a di¤erent track because of their date of birth, the track attended in middle school has no impact on the probability of graduating from any high track school that grants access to college or university. It also points to the important role that specialised high track schools play in explaining why track attendance in middle school has little impact on long-term outcomes. Also note that our calculations based on the School Census for Bavaria and Hesse show that the share of students who graduate from a general or specialised high track is at around 52%, considerably larger than the share of students who attend the high track in middle school (around 36%). This suggests that both July-and June-born students upgrade from the medium to the specialised high track, but June-born students do so more frequently than July-born students.
The …nding so far refers to recent birth cohorts who have not entered the labour market yet. We also con…rm similar movements between the medium and any high track at the end of middle school for earlier cohorts, using data from the 1987 Census (row (iii) in Table 2 ), it has no impact on the probability of completing a general or specialised high track school.
Movements between the Low and Medium Track:
As discussed in Section 2.2, the German school system also provides an opportunity to upgrade from a low to a medium track school after 9th grade. We investigate movements between these two tracks in Panel B
of Table 5 , drawing again on data from the 1987 Census. The results indicate that there is also a substantial amount of movement between the low and medium track: whereas children born in July are 1.9 percentage points more likely to attend at least the medium track in middle school than children born in June (see our …rst-stage estimate in Panel A of Table   2 ), they are only 0.3 percentage points more likely to graduate from at least a medium track school.
Downgrading after Graduation from the High Track: A third adjustment possibility exists after graduation from a (specialised or general) high track school in the form of choosing not to pursue a college or university education. We investigate this form of downgrading in Figure 5 , where, based on data from the social security records, we plot the share of students who do not attend college-although they graduated from a high track school (general or specialised)-against date of birth. The …gure reveals a clear discontinuity around the school entry cut-o¤ date: among individuals who graduated from a high track school, those born after the cut-o¤ date are about 0.7 percentage points more likely not to complete college or university than individuals born after the cut-o¤ date.
In sum, these results provide strong evidence that students who are shifted to a more or less advanced track in middle school because of their date of birth make use of the ‡exibilities built into the German tracking system: they revise their track choices made after elementary school at later stages in the educational career, both in the form of upgrading to a more advanced track at the end of middle school and in the form of downgrading by not enrolling in college or university after graduation from a high track school.
Date of Birth, Track Assignment in Middle School and Highest Degree Completed
Given the substantial amount of up-and downgrading of marginal students after middle school, how does the track attended in middle school a¤ect the highest degree completed?
We investigate this in Figure 6 where we plot the highest degree completed against date of birth, using data from the social security records. The sample consists of all men and women who ever entered the social security data base. 27 We distinguish between three disjoint post-secondary education outcomes: no post-secondary education (Panel A), apprenticeship (Panel B, the typical pathway for graduates from the low or medium track), college or university (Panel C, the typical pathway for graduates from the specialised or general high track). Remarkably, neither …gure shows a clear discontinuity around the school entry cut-o¤ date (the vertical line), suggesting that the up-and downgrading that takes place after middle school fully eliminates the impact of date of birth, and hence the track attended in middle school, on education completed. 28 We report the corresponding reduced-form estimates in Table 6 , using the same speci…cations as in Table 3 . All speci…cations yield similar results, and con…rm the overall picture apparent from Figure 5 that date of birth has no evident impact on education completed. 29 Interestingly, being born in July rather than June (and thus being older at school entry) appears to have, if at all, a negative e¤ect on university or college education. This is fully consistent with the downgrading we illustrate in the previous section.
Discussion and Conclusions
Although a tracking system may be more e¢ cient in tailoring education to the needs of students than a comprehensive system, it has the inherent problem of misallocating students to tracks because of incomplete or erroneous information about the student's learning potential at the time of the tracking decision. This problem may be addressed by the school system if it allows for possibilities to revise initial choices at a later stage, through providing students whose potential is higher (or lower) than initially projected with opportunities to switch 27 Results are very similar if we exclude women from the sample. 28 The …gures reveal strong seasonal e¤ects, with children born in April or May generally outperforming children born in January, similar to those documented by Buckles and Hungerman (2013) . Note that, as emphasized in Section 3, seasonal e¤ects do not pose a threat to our identi…cation strategy as long as it is random whether a woman gives birth just before or just after the school entry cut-o¤ date July 1. 29 The e¤ects of track choice can be easily obtained by dividing these coe¢ cients by the …rst stage estimate of 0.039.
tracks.
Our paper is the …rst to analyze the long-term e¤ects of such ‡exibilities for a tracking system that seems not only to be among the most rigorous, but that also tracks students earliest, around the age of 10. At the same time, this tracking system has an array of built-in possibilities that allow students to modify initial choices at a later stage, after middle school.
Our results suggest that, for these marginal students (i.e. students that are close to the threshold between two di¤erent tracks), the track attended in middle school has no impact on long-term outcomes such as wages, days worked, unemployment, or occupational choice.
We provide evidence that this is because these students take advantage of the ‡exibilities built into the tracking system, and demonstrate that re-tracking takes the form of both an upgrading of marginal students from the middle to the high track after 10th grade, and a downgrading of students who complete the high track but fail to enroll in college or university.
Due to this up-and downgrading, the track attended in middle school has little e¤ect on highest degree completed for marginal students.
Not only are our results important for the debate on the merits and disadvantages of tracking systems, they also suggest that marginal students can make up for substantial weaknesses in earlier education provided they gain access to high quality schools and universities at later stages in their educational careers-even if the exposure to a less challenging school environment is prolonged (in our case 5-6 years) and the di¤erences between school environments in terms of teaching technology and peer and teacher quality are large.
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A Appendix: Additional Results -Table A1 here-- Table A2 here-A. 1 The Impact of Birth Month and Track Assignment in Middle School Figure A1 plots the share of students who at age 14 were attending the high (Panel A) or the low (Panel B) track against birth month based on the school census data. The …gure shows a clear discontinuity in track choice around the school entry cut-o¤ date: children born in July are 5.2 percentage points more likely to attend the high track and 4.2 percentage points less likely to attend the low track than children born in June, for a total e¤ect of 9.4 percentage points.
- Figure A1 here-
A. 2 Comparison of First Stage for Recent Cohorts (School Census) and Older Cohorts (Microcensus)
A comparison of the estimates in Panel A and Panel B of Table 2 clearly indicates a stronger impact of date of birth on track choice for the recent birth cohorts in Bavaria and Hesse than for the older birth cohorts in West Germany, even taking into account the measurement error in the school entry cut-o¤ (9.4% versus 5.0%) 30 . We next investigate whether this di¤erence can be explained by the older cohorts being less being less compliant with the school entry cut-o¤ rule than the more recent birth cohorts. Because Bavaria does not record the year of school entry, meaning we cannot compute its compliance rate, we restrict the analysis to Hesse, whose …rst-stage estimate is 7.3 percent (compared to a 9.4 percent …rst-stage estimate for Hesse and Bavaria combined). The compliance rate for the recent birth cohorts in Hesse is 33.5 percent, whereas that for the older birth cohorts (here proxied by the 1963 birth cohort in the 1970 Census for West Germany) is only 21.9 percent. 31 To estimate the impact of relative age (i.e., being one year older at school entry) on track choice, we divide the e¤ect of birth month on track choice by the e¤ect of birth month on age of school entry and obtain an e¤ect of 23.0 percentage points (0.050/0.219) for the older birth cohorts. For the younger birth cohorts, we estimate a very similar number: 21.8 percentage points (0.078/0.335). Hence, the lower …rst-stage results for the 1961-1976 cohorts in West Germany than for the recent cohorts in Bavaria and Hesse are wholly explained by the older cohorts being less compliant with the school entry age cut-o¤ rule than more recent cohorts. 30 The latter number is computed as follows. By dividing the …rst-stage estimate based on children born in June or July of 9.4% ( Table 2 , Panel B, row (i), column (3)) with the …rst-stage estimate based on children born earlier or later during the year of 7.2% ( Table 2 , Panel B, row (ii), column (3)), we can derive an adjustment factor of 1.29 (0.094/0.072). Multiplying the estimates in Panel A by this adjustment factor indicates that, for the 1961 to 1976 birth cohorts, children born in July are 5 percentage points more likely to attend a more academic middle school than students born in June. 31 Children in the 1963 cohort who were born July through December should not yet have been in school when the census was carried out in spring 1970, whereas children born January through June should have already been attending school. However, regressing an indicator for school attendance on an indicator for being born in July or June results in a coe¢ cient of only 0.219; that is, a compliance with the school entry cut-o¤ rule of 21.9 percent.
A. 3 Birth Month and Graduation from the Higher School Track
Because the school census contains no direct information on degrees obtained, we proxy graduation from the general high track by …rst counting the number of students who, by age 17, 18, and onward, had ever attended a general high track school in grade 13, making sure not to double count students who repeated a grade. Because students drop out of the census on leaving school, we divide this number by the total number of children born in the month, year, and state. We proxy graduation from a specialised high track school as the ratio of the number of students who, by age 22, had ever attended a specialised high track school in grade 12 to the total number of children born in the month, year, and state: b p = # ever reached grade 13 (12) # births
The standard error of this share is estimated as the square root of
The variance of the di¤erence in the shares between July and June born children is given by
Our model assumes three periods: periods 1 and 2, which are schooling periods, and period 3, which is the working period. The beginning of the …rst period corresponds to the end of elementary school (grade 4) when parents decide on which type of middle school their child should attend. The end of this period corresponds to the end of middle school (grade 9 or 10) when children have the opportunity to switch tracks. The second period corresponds to the period of secondary education, and all children enter the labor market at the beginning of period 3. This setup, it should be noted, assumes that the tracks are of equal length, an assumption motivated by our focus on the impact of the learning environment, and of track switching, on long-term outcomes. For simplicity, we distinguish only two tracks, low (L) and high (H).
In this model, children di¤er in both their 'ability', denoted by a, and month of birth, which here is limited to children born in June or July. In line with the independence and exclusion assumptions discussed in Section 3.1, at the beginning of period 1, when the initial track choice is made, children born in July outperform children born in June by , but by the beginning of period 2, when the initial decision can be revised, this advantage has disappeared.
Learning about Children' s Ability: The children's ability is initially uncertain. At the beginning of period 1, parents receive a noisy signal (e.g., a school grade) about their child's ability, denoted by ; expressed as i = a i + " i for children born in July and for children born in June. This formula re ‡ects that if the same signal is observed for two students, one is born in June and the other in July, the student born in June has a higher expected ability. We use G(â) and F (ajâ); respectively, to denote the cumulative distribution functions of the updated abilityâ and the true ability a, conditional onâ. G(â) is normally distributed with mean and variance : By the end of the …rst period, the child's ability is fully revealed, and parents and children can revise their track choice accordingly.
Switching Costs: Switching from a low to a high track school, however, can be costly. Conversely, we assume that moving down from a high to a low track school is costless. We distinguish between two types of switching costs, institutional switching costs (c i ) and academic switching costs (c a ). Institutional switching costs re ‡ect the restrictions the education system puts on upgrading from the low to the high track. For instance, a very rigid tracking system may not o¤er students the possibility to move up from the low to the high track, amounting to in…nite institutional switching costs. Even if the tracking system provides students with opportunities to upgrade, it may be academically costly to do so, re ‡ecting that the less intensive and less abstract teaching method at a low track school (see Section 2.2) may make it di¢ cult for students to keep up with the more advanced learning material at a high track school. We model institutional switching costs as a utility cost which students incur once at the end of period 1 when switching from the low to the high track. In contrast, academic switching costs are modeled as a productivity cost which students incur both in period 2 while in school and in period 3 while working.
Differences between Tracks-Peers: We summarise the productivity or performance of June-versus July-born students in each school track and each period in Table A3 . We focus on the two most important di¤erences between the two tracks: teaching technology and peers (see Table 1 ). 32 To model peer e¤ects, we use a standard linear-in-means peer model in which a higher average peer ability increases the productivity of all students in the same way. We assume that parents take the expectations of the average ability of students in each school type as a given, thereby ignoring the possibility that they can manipulate other parents'expectations through their own track choice. Let^ j t denote parental expectations about the average ability of peers in track j (j = L; H) in period t (t = 1; 2). To contrast parental expectations from the average ability which is realised in equilibrium, we denote the latter by j t : We allow the contemporaneous e¤ect on productivity of peers in period 1 or 2 to di¤er from their e¤ect on productivity in future periods, and denote the e¤ects of peers to whom students are exposed in period t on productivity in period k by k t . Differences between Tracks-Teaching Technology: To model the di¤erences in teaching technology between the school tracks, we assume that learning technology is more sensitive to ability in a high than in a low track school. Speci…cally, the learning technology in the two tracks is linear in the student's ability a and thus is given by j + j a; with j = L; H and L > H and L < H . These assumptions re ‡ect the fact that the teaching technology in a low track school is more adapted to children who are drawn from the lower part of the ability distribution.
As an example, contrast the productivity in period 3 of an individual who attended a low track school in period 1 and a high track school in period 2 ( H + H a + . The di¤erence in the productivity between these two individuals re ‡ects the direct e¤ect of the track attended in period 1, conditional on the track attended in period 2, on the long-term outcomes in period 3. According to our set-up, this e¤ect operates through two channels: …rst, the individual who attended a high track school in both periods has been exposed to better peers in period 1, which may boost labor market performance even when both individuals received the same type of education in period 2 (compare 3 1^ L 1 and 3 1^ H 1 ). Second, the individual who attended a high track school in both periods has not su¤ered the academic cost (c a ) of upgrading from a low to a high track school.
B. 2 Equilibrium
At the beginning of periods 1 and 2, parents (or in period 2, students) choose the track that will yield the highest lifetime utility, which we model as the sum of the student's utility in each period. For simplicity, we assume that in each period, student utility is equal to student productivity (as described in Table A3 ) minus the institutional switching costs and ignore discounting. 33 Period 2 Decision: First, we analyze the parents'decision problem at the beginning of period 2, when the student's ability is fully known. Because in period 2, there is no di¤erence between children born in June and those born in July, the decision problem is the same for both groups. Consider …rst a student who attended a high track school in period 1 who thus does not have to bear the switching costs if she wants to continue at a high track school in period 2. Figure A.2 illustrates the decision problem. In the …gure, we plot, using the solid lines, the student's utility from attending a high or a low track school in period 2 against her ability a: Since the teaching technology in a high track school is more sensitive to ability than in a low track school (i.e., H > L ), the student's utility in a high track school is increasing in ability at a faster rate than in a low track school. Hence, there is an ability threshold a H such that all students whose ability is identi…ed as below a H sort into low track schools, while all students whose ability is identi…ed above a H upgrade to a high track school.
Formally, a student who attended a high track school in period 1 prefers a low over a high track school in period 2 if her utility at a low track school exceeds that at a high track school: 
Note that the quality of peers the student was exposed to in period 1 (^ H 1 ) a¤ect the student's utility in a high and low track school in period 2 equally, and thus do not a¤ect the student's switching decision.
Next, we consider a student who attended a low track school in period 1. This student has to bear the institutional and academic switching costs when upgrading from a low to a high track school in period 2. This lowers her utility in a high track school, as indicated by the dashed line in Figure A2 . It follows that the ability threshold at which this student is indi¤erent between the two tracks, a L ; is above the threshold at which the student who 33 More generally, student utility could in each period be a positive monotonic transformation of student productivity, meaning that the transformation could di¤er in each period. attended a high track in period 1 is indi¤erent between the two tracks, a H . It is easy to show that the di¤erence between the two indi¤erence thresholds is increasing in the switching costs:
Period 1 Decision: Next, we consider the parents'decision problem in period 1, when the student's ability is uncertain. Here, parents take into account the optimal switching behavior in period 2 and choose a low over a high track school if the child's expected utility of attending a low track school exceeds that of attending an high track school. In Section B. 5, we again show that a threshold exists such that all students with expected ability below the threshold attend a low track school, whereas all students with expected ability above the threshold attend a high track school. Because of the initial disadvantage faced by June-born students in period 1, this threshold is smaller for students born in July than for those born in June, b a July < b a June :
We illustrate the impact of month of birth on track choice in period 1 in Figure A3 . Students with expected ability below b a July attend a low track school in period 1 no matter whether they are born in June or July ('never takers'). In contrast, students whose expected ability falls above b a June attend a high track school in period 1 regardless of their date of birth ('always takers'). Students who are shifted from a low to a high track school because of a July birth ('compliers') are students with expected ability between b a July and b a June who are close to indi¤erent between the two tracks. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Students who are shifted between tracks because of their month of birth ('compliers') are students whose expected ability falls close to indi¤erent between school tracks, in the range [b a July ; b a June ]:
See Section B. 5 for an illustration.
Note that in this model, parents send their June-born child with expected ability between b a July and b a June to a low track school even though they know that their child would have attended a high track school had she been born in July, and even though they know that the initial disadvantage of a younger age at school entry fully disappears by the end of the …rst period. Why are parents willing to do this? In our model, the answer is that when deciding which type of school their child should attend, parents take into account the student's utility in the …rst period. 34 Hence, parents trade o¤ a higher utility in the present for a lower utility in the future. Alternatively, we could assume that parents are unaware that students born in June perform more badly on average at the beginning of period 1 than students born in July simply because they are younger. In this case, parents may base their school type decision for period 1 solely on the signal and ignore that a child born in June who has the same school grades as a child born in July (but is relatively younger) has a higher expected ability. Modeling track choice in period 1 in this way has no impact on the key results for our model.
B. 3 Implications
We now turn to the implications of the model, beginning with the impact of track attendance in period 1 on track attendance in period 2.
Track completion: Consider the local average treatment e¤ect of attending a high track school in period 1 (denoted by H 1 ) on the probability of completing that track (i.e., of attending an H school in period 2, denoted by H 2 ). Dividing the reduced-form e¤ect (i.e. Pr(H 2 jZ i =July) Pr(H 2 jZ i =June)) by the …rst-stage e¤ect (i.e. Pr(H 1 jZ i =July) Pr(H 1 jZ i =June)), which corresponds to equations (1) and (2) This e¤ect depends on the di¤erence between the thresholds a L and a H ; which in turn depends on the switching costs c i and c a (see equation (B-1) ). The higher the switching costs, the larger the di¤erence between the thresholds a L and a H ; and the larger the impact of track attendance in period 1 on track attendance in period 2. If there are no switching costs, then a L = a H and the track attended in period 1 has no impact on track completion. We summarise our …ndings the following proposition: 35 Proposition 2: The local average treatment e¤ect of attending a high track in period 1 on attending that track in period 2 increases in the academic and institutional switching costs.
Wage Effects: Consider the local average treatment e¤ect of attending a high (versus a low) track school in period 1 on wages (assumed to be equal to productivity) in period 3, which we again obtain by dividing the reduced-form e¤ect (i.e. Pr(w 3 jZ i = 1) Pr(w 3 jZ i = 1)) by the …rst-stage e¤ect:
The …rst term in equation (B-2) re ‡ects the exposure to better peers in period 1 on productivity in period 3 (i.e., 3 1 
). The second e¤ect re ‡ects the academic of switching from a low to a high track school, weighted by the probability that a 'complier'upgrades to the high track (i.e., Râ J u n ê a J u ly
(1 F (a L jâ))c a dG(â)=(G(â June ) G(â July )). These two e¤ects may be viewed as the direct e¤ects of track attendance in period 1 on productivity in period 3, holding track attendance in period 2 constant. These two e¤ects become larger, the larger the impact of peers in period 1 on productivity in period 3 (i.e., the larger 3 1 ); and the larger the academic switching costs c a . 36 The track attended in period 1 a¤ects wages also through the track attended in period 2. This educational pathway e¤ect, captured by the third term in equation (B-2), becomes larger, the larger the impact of the track attended in period 1 on the track attended in period 2 (i.e., the larger the academic and institutional switching costs, a L versus a H ), and the larger the e¤ect of peers in period 2 on wages in period 3 (i.e., 3 2 ). 37 Note that if both academic and institutional switching costs are zero, then a L = a H and the track attended in period 1 has no impact the track completed in period 2; hence, the third term in (B-2) disappears, as does the second term. The e¤ect of track attendance in period 1 on wages in period 3 reduces to the impact of peers in period 1 on future wages; that is, equation (B-2) becomes 3 1 (^ H 1 ^ L 1 ). These observations lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 3: (i) (Direct E¤ect) The direct e¤ect of attending a high (versus a low) track school in period 1 on wages in period 3, holding constant the track attended in period 2, is larger the higher the importance of peers in period 1 ( 3 1 ) and the higher the academic switching costs (c a ). (ii) The educational pathway e¤ect of attending a high (versus a low) track school in period 1, operating through track completion in period 2, on wages in period 36 The intuitive argument here again ignores the e¤ect of the switching costs on the indi¤erence thresholdŝ a July andâ June : We have con…rmed that this relation holds in equilibrium using extensive simulations. 37 Again, this argument here considers the direct e¤ects only and ignores the e¤ects of 3 2 and 3 2 on the indi¤erence thresholds, but we con…rmed that this relation holds in equilibrium using extensive simulations.
3 is larger the higher the institutional and academic switching costs (c a and c i )and, provided that switching costs are positive, the higher the importance of peers in period 2 ( 3 2 ). (iii) If both the academic and institutional switching costs are zero, the overall e¤ect of attending a high track school in period 1 on wages in period 3 is equal to the impact of peers in period 1 on wages in period 3 (i.e., 3 1 (^ H 1 ^ L 1 )).
B. 4 Interpretation
What do our empirical …ndings imply when viewed through the lens of the model? Recall that we …nd that the track attended in middle school has little impact on completed education, both because students born in June upgrade and because students born in July downgrade. From Proposition 2, this implies that in the German tracking system, both the institutional and academic switching costs are very small. Our …ndings in Table 6 further suggest that 'specialised'high track schools, which are designed to provide access to college or university to students from low or medium track schools, are an important reason for this.
Since the track attended in middle school has no impact on track completion, the e¤ect of track attendance in middle school on wages reduces to the e¤ect of peers in middle school (i.e., in period 1) on wages (see Proposition 3 (iii)). Our …nding of a small wage e¤ect thus suggests that this e¤ect is close to zero (i.e., 3 1 in our model are close to zero). It should be noted that our …ndings are not informative about the importance of peers students are exposed to after middle school (i.e., about 3 2 in our model). In principle, our …ndings are consistent with large peer e¤ects in high school (i.e., period 2 in our model). Our …ndings imply, however, that conditional on the peers students are exposed to in high school (i.e., in period 2), their peers and teachers in middle school (i.e., in period 1) do not matter.
B. 5 Illustration of Proposition 1
Ability Cut-Offs: In period 1, when student ability is uncertain, parents whose child is born in July and has the expected ability b a send their child to a high track school if H + Hâ + Since the child's utility in a track school is increasing in her expected ability at a faster rate than her utility in a low track school, there exists an ability thresholdâ July such that, in period 1, all children whose expected ability is below this threshold attend a low track school while all children whose expected ability is above the threshold attend a high track school.
For a child who is born in June, the parents'decision problem is similar except that the child's utility in the …rst period in a high and low track school is replaced by H + H (â ) + 1 1^ H 1 and L + L (â ) + 1 1^ L 1 ; respectively. It then follows that the expected ability threshold at which children born in June are indi¤erent between attending a low and high track school in the …rst period,â June ; exceeds the threshold at which children born in July are indi¤erent; that is,â June >â July : Consequently, children who are shifted from a low to a high track school because of a July (rather than a June) birth date are children in the expected ability range [â July ;â June ], as given in Proposition 1.
Expected versus Realised Peer Quality: In equilibrium, parental expectations of peer ability in each school type and period must correspond to the realised average ability of children in each school type and period; that is,^ j t = j t : These realised expectations are determined by the ability thresholdsâ July,â June ; a L ; and a H: : Next, we illustrate the computation of j t for students who attend a low track low track school in period 2 ( L 2 ). These students fall into four groups: students born in June or July who attended a low track school in period 1 (who have a measure ofâ J u n e The average ability of the three other groups of students can be computed accordingly.
